Quantum causal models via QBism: the short version by Pienaar, Jacques
Quantum causal models via QBism: the short version
Jacques Pienaar
International Institute of Physics, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte,
Campus Universitario, Lagoa Nova, Natal-RN 59078-970, Brazil.
(Dated: July 12, 2018)
This paper is a concise summary of the main ideas presented in the companion paper,
arXiv:1806.00895 [1]. I present the proposed definition of a quantum causal model with minimal
background and justification, focusing only on its essential physical properties. The mathematical
structure and definitions are provided as an Appendix. I discuss the possible physical significance
of the fact that the model is symmetric under causal inversion.
THE MAIN RESULTS IN A NUTSHELL
For macroscopic (hence “classical”) systems such as
the human body, economic markets, social organizations
and factories, there exist a variety of causal models which
– their differences notwithstanding – agree on the essen-
tial features of causality and on the methods for infer-
ring causal relations from statistics [2–4]. Roughly, a
causal model refers to a pair {P (X), G(X)}, where P (X)
is a probability distribution for a set of random vari-
ables X, and G(X) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
with nodes corresponding to members of X, together
with (i) a set of constraints on the pair {P (X), G(X)}
that must be satisfied in order for G(X) to be a possi-
ble explanation of P (X) (called the Markov condition),
and (ii) a set of rules that allow us to obtain a new
causal model {P (X|action), G(X| action)} which de-
scribes what happens when a certain action is performed
(in classical models, the action is usually an interven-
tion). (Note: precise definitions of italicized terms will
be given in the Appendix).
Recent efforts to extend this kind of causal modeling
to microscopic quantum systems have resulted in a va-
riety of approaches, which so far seem to have little in
common with one another [5–13] . The model presented
here and in Ref. [1] adds to this confusion by propos-
ing yet another approach, having certain novel features.
Its main novelty is symmetry under causal inversion (re-
versal of the directions of all causal arrows). To some
extent this might be expected, since the fundamental
laws governing microscopic systems are believed to be
time-reversible. However, this expectation hinges on the
controversial question of what exactly is the relationship
between causality and the direction of time [14]. The
present work contributes to this discussion by arguing
that symmetry under causal inversion is possible in an
explicit model. To make sense of this counter-intuitive
claim, it is proposed that the direction of causality is
observer-dependent.
The motivation for the model in Ref. [1] is summa-
rized in the following section. The proposed model dif-
fers from a classical causal model in two essential ways.
First, the proposed Quantum Markov Condition rejects
the classical assumption that variables correlated only
by virtue of their common causes should factorize when
one conditions on those causes (the so-called quantita-
tive part of Reichenbach’s common-cause principle [15]);
in this respect the model is consistent with other quan-
tum causal models. Secondly, the actions considered in
the quantum causal model include, in addition to inter-
ventions, the possibility to not perform some measure-
ment that was originally present in the model, which I
call an un-measurement. Classically, it is customary to
assume that measurements are non-disturbing, in which
case the result of an un-measurement is trivially equiva-
lent to ignoring the outcome of the measurement. Quan-
tum un-measurements, by contrast, are non-trivial and
are therefore better regarded as a special type of action,
though distinct from an intervention. This inclusion of
un-measurements among the allowed actions is a com-
pletely novel feature.
In order to compute the probabilities for un-
measurements, we refer to the work of the Quantum
Bayesians (QBists). In seeking to reformulate quantum
theory as a theory of rational inference, the QBists have
already derived precisely the equation we need to de-
scribe un-measurements, using the concept of a symmet-
ric informationally-complete (SIC) measurement [16, 17].
The present work may therefore be understood as the re-
sult of applying the QBist program to the task of causal
modeling.
These simple ingredients lead to a model that is sym-
metric under causal inversion, which means that if P (X)
satisfies the Quantum Markov Condition for a DAG
G(X), then it is also satisfied for the causally inverted
DAG G∗(X), obtained by reversing the direction of all
causal arrows in G(X). It is argued that this symme-
try might have a physical interpretation, as allowing for
interventions by hypothetical observers whose ‘causal ar-
row’ runs contrary to our own.
MOTIVATION FOR THE APPROACH
The quantum causal model presented here is moti-
vated by the following observation. Classically, the pair
{P (X), G(X)} is entirely sufficient to deduce how the
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2system will respond to interventions. Furthermore, the
Markov Condition is sufficient to derive inequality con-
straints on P (X) imposed by the causal structure G(X)
(of which the famous Bell inequalities are a special case),
which must be satisfied if the causal model is to qualify
as a valid description of the system. Since quantum sys-
tems routinely violate these inequalities in experiments
where the causal structure is thought to be known (and
if we do not wish to concede the existence of causal in-
fluences hidden from us) a natural recourse is to define
a new kind of causal model that can accommodate such
violations.
In the literature, the most common solution is to re-
place the simple DAG G(X) with a richer structure, such
as a quantum process theory, a generalized quantum net-
work (quantum comb), or something similar. This new
structure provides the causal relations, indicates the re-
sults of interventions and implies the known bounds on
quantum correlations (viz. the amount by which they
violate classical inequalities). A potential weakness with
this broad approach is that there are many different ways
to do it, as shown by the diverse literature [5–11, 13, 18–
20].
The approach taken here is grounded on the premise
that a quantum causal model, like its classical counter-
part, does not require anything more than a DAG G(X)
to represent causal structure. The particular structure of
quantum probabilities must therefore be located within
an appropriately defined Quantum Markov Condition,
and in the rules that describe how the system responds
to certain actions. This idea turns out to be remarkably
restrictive, and almost entirely determines the properties
of the resulting model.
One obstacle to this program is that, as argued in
Ref. [1] and supported by the literature, any reasonable
choice of Quantum Markov Condition is no longer suffi-
cient to determine the bounds on quantum correlations,
at least without supplementing G(X) directly with ad-
ditional structure, which would be contrary to our aim.
To get around this, it is observed that the constraints
on the allowed quantum probabilities can be re-cast as
constraints on the way in which a quantum system re-
sponds to an un-measurement, that is, the rule that tells
us what probabilities to expect when a certain measure-
ment is not performed, in terms of the probabilities that
obtain when the measurement is present.
This rule, known to the Quantum Bayesians as the Ur-
gleichung [16], implies certain constraints on the space of
allowed probabilities which enable bounds on quantum
correlations to be derived from it [17]. Since the rule is
defined under the assumption that the un-measurement
in question is a SIC-measurement, we are thus led to as-
sume that an idealized experiment (for the purposes of
causal inference) is one in which all measurements are
SIC-measurements. This rather strong assumption de-
termines the various properties of the Quantum Markov
Condition proposed in Ref. [1], including the property
that the quantitative part of Reichenbach’s Principle no
longer holds in general.
Another obstacle to the program is that, unlike the
classical case, the pair {P (X), G(X)} is no longer suffi-
cient in general to deduce the statistics that result from
an intervention. However, it turns out to still be possi-
ble provided that the DAG belongs to a special sub-class
of graphs called QDAGs, in which the variables can be
partitioned into a set of causally ordered ‘slices’ [1]. By
requiring G(X) to be a QDAG, this obstacle is overcome.
The end result of these considerations is that it is
possible to define a quantum causal model capable of
making predictions about both interventions and un-
measurements based only on the pair {P (X), G(X)} and
the Quantum Markov Condition; moreover the model
goes some way towards imposing bounds on quantum
correlations (but see Ref. [17] and the remarks in Sec.
IV.A of Ref. [1] for qualifications of this claim). Al-
though much of the structure of the model is derived
by first considering its representation as a quantum cir-
cuit, the key features of the model refer only to relations
between conditional probability distributions, and there-
fore do not depend on the details of the circuit. Thus,
unlike other models, one can remain ambivalent about
whether or not the circuit represents an objective ‘un-
derlying’ structure or merely a convenient fiction; the
only details relevant for causal inference are the observed
statistics and the raw causal relations G(X).
KEY PROPERTIES OF THE MODEL
The properties of the quantum causal model can be
summarized by considering just two paradigmatic cases:
the common cause and the common effect (Figs. 1,2).
The main features are summarized in Table I. As is evi-
dent from the table, the classical constraints on the cor-
relations among the variables differ between the common
cause and common effect, indicating a causal asymmetry.
By contrast, the quantum constraints on correlations are
exactly the same for the common cause and the com-
mon effect, which is due to the inherent symmetry of
the Quantum Markov Condition. These features are ex-
plained below.
Fig. 1 (a) shows a DAG G(A,B,C) representing
a common cause, and Fig. 1 (b) shows a possible
functional model (quantum circuit) for this DAG. Let
{P (A,B,C), G(A,B,C)} be a quantum causal model for
the DAG of Fig. 1 (a). If this were a classical causal
model, then the following three constraints would be ex-
pected to hold (from the Classical Markov Condition
[2, 3] ):
(i) A and B should generally be correlated if one does
not condition on C;
(ii) The correlation between A and B should disappear
3TABLE I. Key properties of the Quantum Markov Condition
Classical Quantum
Common Cause Common Effect Common Cause Common Effect
A,B correlated? X × × ×
A,B correlated conditional on C? × X X X
FIG. 1. (a) A DAG representing a common cause and (b) one
of the possible functional models corresponding to this DAG.
The meter-boxes represent SIC-measurements, U is a unitary
gate and I represents the maximally mixed state. Bold wires
represent quantum systems, and the thin wires exiting from
the side of the meter boxes represent classical systems (i.e.
measurement data). The quantum systems are discarded at
the end of the process, but the classical records are retained.
when one conditions on C.
The constraint (ii) is called the quantitative part of Re-
ichenbach’s Principle of Common Causes. The con-
straint (i) has been called the Principle of Independence
[14], because it expresses the commonplace intuition that
variables are independent prior to interaction, and not
afterwards. However, this is something of a misnomer,
since the important part is the ‘...and not afterwards’,
which implies that variables with a shared history tend
to be correlated; it would therefore be better named the
‘Principle of Correlation’. Note that (i) and (ii) should
not be confused with the logically independent qualita-
tive part of Reichenbach’s Principle of Common Causes,
which may be stated as:
(iii) If two variables are correlated (and neither is a cause
of the other) they must share a common cause.
This constraint (iii) is equivalent to saying that the vari-
ables must be independent if they do not share a common
cause, but note that this would still permit a model in
which A and B were required to be independent despite
having a common cause C, and hence (iii) does not have
the power to imply (i). All three constraints (i),(ii),(iii)
generally hold in classical causal models.
Regarding Fig. 1, it is apparent that (ii) will be false
for our quantum causal model (i.e. according to our
Quantum Markov Condition). It is generally possible to
arrange for A,B to become independent conditional on
a particular value of C, for instance by arranging that
the post-measurement state Πc conditioned on C = c
′ is
a product state between the Hilbert spaces subsequently
measured at A,B in the circuit of Fig. 1 (b). However,
since the model assumes that the set { 1dC Πc : ∀c ∈ C} is a
SIC-POVM, the remaining values c 6= c′ cannot also cor-
respond to projectors with such a product form. Hence,
simply conditioning on the outcome of C will typically
not eliminate correlations between A,B, and so (ii) must
be rejected as a constraint.
Actually, the situation is even more drastic: the cor-
relations between A,B only exist when one conditions
on the outcome of C. If one does not condition on C,
then the joint quantum state being measured by A,B is
maximally mixed and thus uncorrelated. Hence the con-
straint (i) is also false in our quantum causal model. Note
that this is purely due to the fact that SIC-measurements
belong to a special class of quantum processes that are
unbiased, meaning that the mere fact that C was per-
formed cannot change the maximally mixed state into
some other state, if one does not also condition on the
outcome C = c. One might perhaps object to the model’s
assumption that the quantum state begins in the maxi-
mally mixed state, as is evident from the circuit Fig.
1 (b) and is indeed part of the definition of the func-
tional model. This objection fails because, upon reflec-
tion, the only occasions we have to know the state of a
system are those in which we prepared it in that state
by first performing some measurement upon it and con-
ditioning on the outcome of that measurement. Prior to
the preparation procedure, the state is completely un-
known and therefore best described as maximally mixed.
If this aspect of the causal model appears strange, it is
only because we are accustomed to leaving the prepara-
tion procedure implicit in the definition of initial state,
rather than including it as a process explicitly within the
model, as it is here.
Turning now to the common effect scenario of Fig. 2,
note that the following constraints on P (A,B,C) would
be expected to hold for a classical causal model:
(iv) A and B should generally be independent if one does
not condition on C;
(v) A and B should generally be correlated if one condi-
tions on C.
The constraint (iv) is just a special instance of (iii), the
qualitative part of Reichenbach’s Principle of Common
Causes, when A,B have no common cause. To see that
this is also true in the quantum causal model, note that
A,B represent measurements on independently prepared
4FIG. 2. (a) A DAG representing a common effect and (b) one
of the possible functional models corresponding to this DAG.
subsystems in the functional model Fig. 2 (b). The con-
straint (v) is widely known as Berkson’s effect in statis-
tics. It remains true for our quantum causal model, since
post-selecting on an outcome C = c corresponds to post-
selecting the final state of the circuit Fig. 2 (b) to be
the pure state Πc, and this will typically induce corre-
lations between A,B. Note that these post-selection-
induced correlations can violate the classical bound (i.e.
Bell inequalities) precisely up to the quantum bound; this
‘quantum Berkson effect’ has been studied in Ref. [21].
In summary, the proposed model rejects the Principle
of Independence and the quantitative part of Reichen-
bach’s Principle of Common Causes, (i),(ii), while up-
holding the qualitative part of Reichenbach’s Principle
and Berkson’s effect, (iii),(iv),(v). While the rejection of
(ii) is relatively commonplace in the literature, the rejec-
tion of (i) is somewhat more of a novelty. Note that the
model’s symmetry under causal inversion depends on this
rejection, since otherwise one could use (i) to differenti-
ate between the common cause and the common effect by
checking for the existence of a-priori correlations between
A and B.
INTERPRETATION OF THE CAUSAL
SYMMETRY
At first glance, the symmetry of the quantum causal
model under causal inversion seems to be a weakness.
Imagine, for instance, that you are given the statistical
data P (A,B,C) and asked to decide, based only upon
this data, whether the variable C is a common cause of
A,B as in Fig. 1 (a), or a common effect as in Fig. 2
(a). Due to the symmetry of the model, one cannot tell
the difference without performing an intervention. Yet,
the difference would become obvious after performing an
intervention on C: if it is a common cause, then A,B
would each remain correlated to C after the intervention,
whereas if it is a common effect, these correlations would
disappear. In other words, the common cause should
allow C to signal to A and B, but the common effect
would not.
On this basis, one might argue that the constraints
specified by the Quantum Markov Condition are too
weak to do effective causal inference. Given that there is
a preferred direction of causality within the system (eg.
common cause versus common effect), then it seems rea-
sonable that we should at least sometimes be able to in-
fer this direction from the observed statistics P (A,B,C)
prior to any interventions. Yet, the proposed Quantum
Markov Condition renders such causal inference impos-
sible without interventions. It therefore seems to be ig-
noring useful causal information.
On further inspection, the matter is more subtle.
The symmetry of the statistics P (A,B,C) is enforced
by the property of SIC-measurements that they are
informationally-symmetric, which means that the pre-
measurement state of the system conditioned on the mea-
surement outcome is the same as the post-measurement
state conditioned on the outcome (this concept was re-
cently introduced in the context of quantum causal in-
ference [19]). This means that in order to fully spec-
ify the measurement, it is not necessary to make any
formal distinction between the “input” and the “out-
put” of the measurement. Consequently, such measure-
ments are agnostic about the overall direction of causal-
ity: one can switch the labels of input/output and still
obtain a valid SIC-measurement. If we were to ad-
mit into our causal model measurements that were not
informationally-symmetric, and thus which might enable
us to infer the overall causal direction without perform-
ing an intervention, we would have to specify a priori
a preferred labeling of input/output and thereby impose
on the system the very causal arrow that we would seek
to “infer” from the measurement statistics!
Still, one might insist that there exists an intrinsic di-
rection of causality in the system, whether or not it can
be inferred from the data prior to interventions. After
all, when we finally do perform an intervention, do we
not reveal this very direction? To answer this, it is nec-
essary to examine the features of an ‘intervention’ on a
quantum causal model. This can be done most easily
by referring to what an intervention means for the cor-
responding functional model. To intervene on, say, the
SIC-measurement W in the circuit Fig. 3 (a), one would
perform the following procedure:
I1. Discard the quantum system that would normally be
input to the measurement W ;
I2. Deterministically prepare a system in the desired
state Πw and submit it as the output of W .
It is clear that this intervention leads to asymmetric
statistics, since different choices of w will have the power
to influence the probabilities of the measurement out-
comes of D, but not A. This is just to say that the
intervention can signal into its causal future (as defined
by the circuit) but not into its causal past. However, it
would serve us well to examine the origin of this asymme-
5FIG. 3. (a) One of the possible functional models corresponding to a QDAG with four nodes A,W,Z,D (shown inset).
The meter-boxes represent SIC-measurements, U ,V are unitary gates and I represents the maximally mixed state. (b) The
functional model resulting from an intervention on W to set W = w, and the corresponding post-intervention QDAG (shown
inset).
FIG. 4. (a) A possible functional model corresponding to the causal inverse QDAG (shown inset), obtained by time-reversing the
circuit of Fig. 3 (a) and replacing U ,V with U†,V†. The result of an intervention on the reversed circuit (and its corresponding
QDAG) is shown in (b).
6try to make sure that we have not sneaked it in by hand.
On inspection, we see that we have: it was in the defini-
tion of the ‘intervention’ where it was asserted that the
‘input’ system should be discarded and the ‘output’ re-
prepared. On what basis are we allowed to assign these
input/output labels prior to having information about
the overall direction of causality? It seems that, prior
to the intervention, the statistics P (A,W,Z,D) would
have been equally compatible with the QDAG Fig. 4
(a), whose functional model is now the time-reverse of
the circuit in Fig. 3 (a). An intervention on this circuit
would produce the opposite effect, namely, it would per-
mit signaling to A but not to D, as shown in Fig. 4 (b).
Thus, we cannot know a priori the outcome of an inter-
vention without knowing which of these QDAGs is the
correct one, and this cannot be inferred from the statis-
tics P (A,W,Z,D). Thus, the very definition of an inter-
vention requires a pre-commitment to the input/output
labelling and hence to the direction of causality, so we
cannot appeal to interventions as a means to infer this
direction. Ultimately, experience shows that the correct
choice is to align the causal direction with our own di-
rection of time (i.e. the direction of entropy increase in
the laboratory), but there is nothing in the causal model
that can tell us this: we must put it in by hand.
CONCLUSIONS
At the end of the day, it is an incontrovertible fact
that only one direction describes the direction of causal-
ity that we see in actual experiments. We have yet to
perform an intervention on a variable that would allow
us to influence the statistics of another variable in its
causal past (and a Nobel Prize awaits the first person to
do that!). However, in the context of the present discus-
sion, this impossibility must not be seen as resulting from
some preferred direction of causality intrinsic to the sys-
tem, for we have just seen that there is no way to reveal
such a preferred direction that does not end up putting it
in by hand. Instead, we must conclude that the very real
impossibility of sending information into our own past via
interventions on physical systems is rather due to some
physical constraint on the way that we – as macroscopic
physical systems – are able to interact with the system.
To the extent that the direction of causality is a determi-
nate fact, therefore, it is determinate only relative to a
choice of macroscopic observer. We may verify repeatedly
that the causal relation X → Y holds in a system, but
we have as yet no reason to exclude the possibility that
some other observer interacting with the system could
bring about the opposite relation. This possibility, at
least, can be naturally accommodated in the symmetric
causal model described here.
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Appendix: Mathematical description of the model
This Appendix lays out the bare mathematical struc-
ture of the proposed quantum causal model and the
definitions for references in the main text. The following
notation is used: uppercase roman letters such as X
denote random variables, and lowercase roman letters
such as x denote their possible values. Bold upper-
7case X refers to a set of random variables, and bold
lowercase x to a corresponding set of possible values.
Probability distributions and conditional distributions,
like P (X = x|Y = y)∀x, y, will simply be abbreviated as
P (X|Y ). The set union symbol ‘∪’ will often be omitted
for the sake of tidy expressions. Note that although
conditioning on ‘Y ’ is thus interpreted as conditioning
on its value (i.e. on Y = y), the similar-looking terms
Y do, Y +, Y − appearing below refer to pieces of informa-
tion about Y other than its value (indeed, in the case of
Y −, the value of Y would not even be well-defined since
Y − means that ‘Y was not performed’).
Definition: SIC-POVM
A SIC-POVM on a Hilbert space HX of dimension dX is
a set of d2X linear operators { 1dΠx : x = 1, 2, ..., d2X} sat-
isfying
d2X∑
x
1
d
Πx = IX where IX is the identity operator
on HX , and also satisfying:
Tr [ΠxΠx′ ] =
dXδx,x′ + 1
dX + 1
, x, x′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., d2X} .
(1)
Definition: SIC-measurement
A SIC-measurement on a system with Hilbert space
HX is described by a SIC-POVM { 1dΠx}. For a
system in the state ρ prior to measurement, the SIC-
measurement produces the outcome x with probability
P (x) = Tr
[
ρ 1dΠx
]
. Conditional on the outcome x, the
post-measurement state is Πx.
Definition: Possible explanation
A causal graph G(X) is said to be a possible explanation
for a distribution P (X) on a set of N variables X if
there exists a functional model that has the same causal
structure as G(X) and is capable of producing the
statistics P (X) (see the next definition for details). For
classical systems, the definition of a functional model
can be found in eg. Ref. [2, 3]. For quantum systems,
the following new definition is proposed:
Definition: Quantum functional model
A quantum functional model for the variables X is a
quantum circuit having the following special properties:
(i) For every variable Xi ∈ X, i = (1, 2, ..., N) the
circuit contains a corresponding SIC-measurement
whose outcomes correspond to the possible values xi of
Xi (Thus, a functional model only exists for variables
with a square integer number of values);
(ii) Every input to the circuit is the maximally mixed
state;
(iii) Aside from SIC-measurements, the only other
processes in the circuit are unitary processes;
(iv) Every quantum output from the circuit is discarded
(traced out). Only the classical data in the form of
the joint probability P (X) of the outcomes of the
SIC-measurements is retained.
The causal structure G(X) of a functional model is
then obtained by the following rule: Xi is a parent of
Xj iff there is a wire in the circuit from the output of
the measurement Xi to the input of the measurement
Xj that is not intercepted by any other measurements
in X (though it may pass through unitary gates).
Definition: Quantum Markov Condition
Let U,V,W be disjoint subsets of X. A pair
{P (X), G(X)} is said to satisfy the Quantum
Markov Condition if the constraint P (UV|W) =
P (U|W)P (V|W) holds whenever every undirected path
between U and V is blocked by W. A path between two
variables is said to be ‘blocked’ by the set W iff at least
one of the following conditions holds:
g-SSO: There is a chain A → C → B along the path
whose middle member C is in W;
g-BK: There is a collider A → C ← B on the path
where C is not in W and has no descendants in W.
g-BK*: There is a fork A← C → B on the path where
C is not in W and has no ancestors in W.
Claim: Suppose that G(X) is a possible explanation
of P (X) (i.e. a functional model exists with causal
structure G(X) that produces P (X)). Then the pair
{P (X), G(X)} satisfies the Quantum Markov Condition
(This is argued in Ref. [1]).
Definition: QDAG
A DAG G(X) is called a QDAG if there exists a set of
variables SXi associated to every node Xi ∈ X such that
no member of {SXi ∪ Xi} (called the slice containing
Xi) is a cause of any other member, and such that every
path from an ancestor of Xi to a descendant of Xi is
intercepted by at least one member of the slice, i.e.
every path contains a causal chain X → Y → Z whose
middle member Y is in {SXi ∪Xi}.
Definition: Quantum Causal Model
A quantum causal model is a pair {P (X), G(X)} that
satisfies the Quantum Markov Condition, where G(X) is
a QDAG, and for which the results of interventions and
un-measurements are defined by the rules given in the
definitions to follow (see Ref. [1] for justification).
Definition: Interventions
Let {P (X), G(X)} be a quantum causal model. A
measurement Y introduced into this model is called an
intervention on some variable W ∈ X iff the resulting
model, denoted {P (X, Y |Y do), G(X, Y |Y do)}, satisfies
the following properties:
(i) Y is a direct cause of W and only W in G(X, Y |Y do);
8(ii) The performance or non-performance of the interven-
tion Y on W does not affect the conditional distribution
of variables that are not descendants of W . Formally,
let A,R denote the non-descendants of W , and let Y do
represent the information ‘Y was performed’ and Y − the
information that ‘Y was not performed’. Then:
P (A,R|W,Y do) = P (A,R|W,Y −) . (2)
(iii) The performance or non-performance of the interven-
tion Y on W does not affect the conditional distribution
of variables that are not ancestors of W . Formally, let
D,R denote the non-ancestors of W . Then:
P (D,R|W,Y do) = P (D,R|W,Y −) . (3)
(iv) The value of W is equal to the value of Y , hence W
has no other causes in G(X, Y |Y do);
(v) Y has no parents in the system, i.e. it is exogenous
in G(X, Y |Y do).
When an intervention Y is performed on W in the
causal model {P (X), G(X)}, the resulting statistics
P (X, Y |Y do) are given by:
P (X|Y, Y do) =
P (D,RD|W,SW , Y −) δ(W,Y )P (SW ,A,RA|W,Y −) ,
(4)
where {SW ∪ W} is the slice containing W , and RD
(resp. RA) are the descendants (resp. ancestors) of
SW that are not descendants (resp. ancestors) of W
in G(X). The DAG G(X, Y |Y do) resulting from the
intervention is obtained by the same procedure as in
the classical case, i.e. by deleting the parents of W and
introducing Y as its sole parent.
Definition: Un-measurements
Consider a quantum causal model {P (X, Z), G(X, Z)}
and let D (resp. A) be the descendents (resp. ancestors)
of Z in G(X, Z) and let R be the remaining variables
excluding Z. Then the statistics that one would obtain
if the measurement Z were not to be performed (i.e. the
result of un-measuring Z) are given by:
P (X|Z−) =
d2Z∑
z
P (D|A,R, z, Z+)
[
(1 + dZ)P (z|A,R, Z+)− 1
dZ
]
×P (A,R|Z+) ,
(5)
where Z+ denotes the information that ‘Z was per-
formed’ and Z− denotes that ‘Z was not performed’.
The DAG G(X) resulting from the un-measurement
of Z is obtained from G(X, Z) by deleting Z and its
connected arrows, and then connecting every former
parent of Z to every former child of Z.
